Sharp falls in uncertainty about job loss ought to increase the expenditure of durable goods and the likelihood of undertaking costly-to-reverse decisions, such as forming a new household and housing demand. We exploit the large differences in firing costs across contract types in the Spanish labor market to identify the causal link between sharp changes in the risk of job loss and the timing of different forms of household formation among youths. Our identification strategy uses variation in regional incentives to promote high-firing cost contracts between 1997 and 2009. Hiring subsidies predict job stability. We find that the probability of forming a household increases by 0.7% through home ownership and by 4% through renting the new accommodation. We also encounter that the probability of forming a new household peaks two years after an exogenous increase in job security, mainly through renting. The fact that the least costly form of household formation reacts to job security with such a delay is consistent with the presence of credit constraints or search costs.
Introduction
There are large time and cross-country differences in the rate of household formation among young adults, leading to very different household structures. The patterns of household formation of young adults have important consequences for resource allocation and for public policy, mainly four. First, understanding whether or not the extended family insures young adults against job insecurity in the labor market prospect is important to assess how vulnerable workers cope with the risk of falling into poverty (Kaplan, 2012 , Haider and McGarry, 2005 , Card and Lemieux, 2000 and, more generally, to assess to what extent family ties matter for economic outcomes (Alesina and Giuliano, 2008) .
Second, the tepid recovery of the US housing market after the Great Recession is usually explained by the fall in the household formation rate in US [see Paciorek (Neal, 1999) , and diminishing the speed of adjustment to regional 1 shocks. Fourth, high rates of coresidence put into question the sustainability and the incidence of programs that redistribute income from the young to the elderly. Social Security is in risk when fertility drops, and fertility is lumped with household formation in Southern Europe (Billari et al., 2001 ). Regarding the incidence of public programs, young adults who live with their parents share consumption of housing and of other goods. Under dynastic resource sharing, intergenerational redistribution from young to elderly may not be effective, because an euro that a young adult passes on to an elderly through a public program may be given back through private resource sharing. protection for the elderly and cohabitation between young and old agents arise endogenously. On the other hand, the empirical literature has confirmed a negative link between the risk of losing the job by young adults and the rate of household formation mainly using measures of risk that are aggregated at the regional level. Becker et al. (2007b) document that the probability that a young adult forms a new household is specially high in Italian regions where the stock of young adults hired with fixed-term contracts is diminishing. Bleemer et al. (2014) find that young millenials in the US react to unemployment by staying longer with their parents, but the relationship may be mediated by the incidence 2 Recent research has tried to address the question: why do young adults in some countries stay so long with their parents?. Giuliano (2007) highlights the role of culture in shaping the living arrangements of the youth. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1994) find that low-income children are more likely to live with parents (holding parental income constant). Manacorda and Moretti (2006) document that parents with higher income levels are more likely to live with their children, consistent with the predictions of an exchange model of the extended family. Martins and Villanueva (2009) study the impact of borrowing costs on household formation. We summarize below the literature that measures the impact of employment risk on household formation.
of debt (Dettling and Hsu, 2016) . In Spain, Gutiérrez-Doménech (2008) finds that Spanish females living in regions where fixed-term contracts are relatively common tend to postpone the decision of marrying. Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) document that unemployment rates are positively related to rates of cohabitation. 3 Our study focuses on the impact of the risk of job loss on the probability that a young adult forms a new household using contract-specific lay-off costs in the Spanish labor market. Like Italy, France, Portugal or Sweden, Spain introduced low firing-cost contracts during the eighties, and those were mainly used to hire particular demographic groups, like female and/or young workers (see Dolado et al., 2002) . Spanish firms pay higher firing costs upon unilateral termination of permanent (high firing cost) contracts than for finishing fixed-term contracts; between 33 and 45 wage days per year worked (in our sample period) vs almost zero at termination if the firm does not renew the temporary contract. Many researchers have documented that workers with jobs regulated by fixed-term (FT) contracts were exposed to higher instability; they faced a much higher probability of transiting into unemployment than those in jobs regulated by "permanent" (high firing cost) contracts (Bover and Gómez, 2004) . (2005) is an exception as they use individual variation in young adult's contract type and contract conversions to estimate the link between employment instability of the youth and marriage and fertility decisions. We document below that the strong correlation between household formation and contract upgrades does not hold when one instruments contract conversion. Aggregate data also seems to confirm the result. Becker et al. (2007b) and Fogli (2004) also present aggregate evidence consistent with the result.
based measures of risk are closest to the theoretical benchmark, that links the decision of forming a household to the individual situation, rather than to aggregate outcomes. 4 Our main contribution is then to estimate the link between a young adult's exposure to the risk of losing the job, measured by low firing cost contracts, and the probability of forming a new household using variation arguably uncorrelated with other variables that determine household formation.
We contribute from García-Ferreira and Villanueva (2007) in which we study the possible delay of the decision of household formation various years after the time of the conversion of job contracts. García-Ferreira and Villanueva (2007) do not encounter a significant short-run effect of an exogenous increase in job security on household formation, at least in two quarters after conversion using quarterly data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey. Moreover, in some specifications the unsignificant estimates of the impact of job security on household formation is wrong sign. Unlike García-Ferreira and Villanueva (2007), we also study the way on which individuals form a new household by renting a new accommodation or by the purchase of the owner-occupied house.
Our identification strategy exploits variation across Spanish regions in the introduction and the amount of subsidies to firms to convert fixed-term contracts into permanent ones. Those incentives were introduced in 1997 by different regional authorities as a response of growing rates of fixed-term contracts. Not all regional governments decided to implement subsidies (right-wing regional governments were less likely to do so), and among those regional governments that decided to give subsidies to conversion, the amount of the subsidy varied among groups. Using the 2002-2011 waves of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (EFF), we construct a stock sample of household members, individuals observed working as employees with a fixed-term contract or with a permanent one. We first document that the mean subsidy in the region (holding regional characteristics constant) was positively related with the proportion of perma-nent contracts in the sample. Our results suggest that exogenous increases in job security leads youths to form a new household very sluggishly, the demand for new accommodation seems to happen one or two years after most conversions have occurred. The most delayed decision seems to be rental, the housing tenure regime associated with the lowest adjustment costs and the easiest to reverse in case of a risk materialized. Next we will try to investigate whether this finding may be related to the presence of liquidity constraints that affect more seriously to renters.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides some background on the Spanish labor market and on living arrangements. Section 2 lays out the empirical strategy in the analysis of household formation and housing demand in the medium run, Section 3 describes the data used in the estimation, Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
1 Fixed-term contracts and living arrangements of the youth In 1997 a national-wide reform reduced the cost of firing permanent workers from 45 wage-days per year worked to 33 wage-days (see Kugler et al., 2005) .
Fixed term contracts: legal framework
At the same time, some of the 17 regional authorities decided to subsidize firms who signed permanent contracts, possibly in response to the growing incidence of fixed-term contracts among vulnerable workers -see García Pérez and Rebollo Sanz (2009), who also examine the impact of those subsidies on labor market flows. Subsidies to contract conversion were typically lump-sum amounts given to firms that proved that a new permanent contract was signed (either by an existing worker whose job was regulated by a fixed-term contract or by a new worker who was unemployed). In some cases, the subsidies took the form of a reduction in the payroll tax . while workers covered by a fixed-term contract faced a probability of transiting into unemployment of about 12% in a given quarter, the corresponding probability for a worker covered by a permanent contract was about 3%.
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Whether or not workers covered under a fixed-term contract actually perceive a higher chance of transiting into unemployment than other workers is less clear (see Manski and Straub, 2000) . Workers whose employment relation is regulated by a permanent contract may perceive that if they lose their job, there are few chances of finding a comparable one, because most exits from unemployment typically happen through fixed-term contracts. Alternatively, some workers may be covered by a fixed-term contract, but still perceive small chances of 6 Table A.21 also documents that the size of subsidies varied over time (see the case of Galicia, where subsidies were removed in 1998), and also among demographic groups; Andalucia had special subsidies for firms who changed the contract of workers below 30 years of age into a permanent one. Some regions had higher subsidies for females (Comunidad Valenciana, Cantabria and Navarra, for example). 7 Regressions of the probability of transiting into unemployment on an indicator of fixedterm contract, age, occupation and industry dummies deliver similar results. 2 The identification strategy in the empirical analysis: regional variation in subsidies to contract conversion
The correlation between contract type and household formation is confounded by several concurrent factors hard to observe, summarized in a footnote. 8 Thus, our study exploits variation in contract type that is weakly correlated with either the ability of the worker or the local labor market. We discuss the source of exogenous variation in contract type below. We also describe the empirical models estimated using samples of stock data (the fraction of permanent contracts held) and duration models for the study of the impact of job security on 8 Young adults with a higher degree of maturity may have a higher taste for independency and be more committed to the labor market, making the firm more likely to be willing to upgrade a contract into an open-ended one. A simple regression of an indicator of living with parents and type of contract will confound the impact of employment risk with workers' maturity. Second, in a context of limited worker mobility, young adults may face different local labor markets (Topel, 1986) . Young adults in better local labor markets may face higher probabilities of being promoted, if they are a relatively more scarce resource, and for the same reason, expect higher future earnings, a factor that increases household formation.
household formation in the medium run (several years after the conversion of job contracts is expected to happen). This paper investigates if job insecurity leads youths to delay their decision of forming a new household several years after the risk of job loss disappears and if job insecurity affects the form of household formation, rather than the probability of leaving the parental household. Young adults may react to the presence of the risk of job loss by choosing routes of household formation that involve lower adjustment costs in the case of an income drop. Home ownership involves large adjustment costs in face of an income downturn; selling a house is a costlier process than leaving a rented accommodation.
As explained below, in order to obtain estimates of the causal impact of job insecurity on housing tenure we exploit exogenous variation in firing costs due to the existence of regional subsidies for the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent ones as documented in Section 1, in a similar way to that done in the second strategy for the analysis of short-run effects in García-Ferreira and Villanueva (2007) and by Barceló and Villanueva (2016) to analyze the households' precautionary wealth against the risk of job loss. Basically, we assume that the evolution over time of those subsidies is uncorrelated with decisions of household formation for channels other than the conversion of a temporary contract into a permanent one.
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The long-run effects of job security on housing tenure and household formation are analyzed using two different estimation approaches. The first uses a stock sample of young individuals to study these decisions, where we can assess the validity of our key identifying variable of exogenous risk of job loss (regional subsidies for contract conversions) for estimating these impacts. The second approach estimates a duration model using a sample of multiple transitions to a new accommodation as an emancipated person depending on the housing tenure regime chosen. In this way, we study the number of years elapsed since the job contract was signed until the individual forms a new household with one of the two housing tenure regimes considered.
Estimates from a stock sample of individuals
To investigate if job security affects the housing tenure regime that young workers choose to live when they form a household independent of their parents, we show causal evidence from the 2002-2011 waves of the triennial Spanish Survey of Household Finances (in Spanish, Encuesta Financiera de las Familias, EFF). We follow a similar estimation strategy to that carried out in Barceló and Villanueva (2016) to estimate the household wealth response to the risk of job loss. To study the impact of job security on the housing tenure regime, we use the sample as a series of cross-sections, where the dependent variable is the living arrangement of the youth (staying with parents, owning or renting his or her new accommodation), and the independent variable, Subsidy r,a,t0 , is the incentive that the employer of the youth has to upgrade a contract into a high firing cost one.
That is, we regress the form of household formation (Y i,t ) on region indicators (µ r , omitted region: Madrid), age-at-hire indicators (µ a , the omitted group is 31-40 years of age) and year-of-hire indicators (µ t0 , the omitted year is 1999).
The model also includes calendar year dummies (µ t , the omitted year is 2002) and some explanatory variables included in X i,t , such as indicators of individual's gender and education level and a third-order polynomial on the logarithm of the total labor earnings received in the previous year. The subindex i refers to individuals in the sample and ε r,a,t0,i,t denotes the error term in the equation, distributed with a zero mean. The specification permits examining how the incentive to convert a fixed-term contract into an open-ended one in the first two years of the individuals' job tenure affects their household formation decision, i.e. our parameter of interest is θ 1 .
The key variable identifying the risk of job loss is Subsidy r,a,t0 , which measures the economic incentive a firm in a given region r and in a given year t 0 faces to upgrade a fixed-term contract into a permanent one for an individual with age a. We do not observe if the firm for which the young adult works actually got the subsidy, we only use the amount of the subsidy the firm is eligible for, presented in Table A .1. Our parameter of interest in this specification, θ 1 , measures the causal impact of a decrease in the probability of losing the job on the propensity to establish a new household. 
Estimates from a sample of multiple transitions to a new house as an emancipated person through two alternative housing tenure regimes
In order to investigate further the long-run effects of job security on the decision of housing tenure and on household formation, we study the relationship between the exact year in which individuals move to a new house (rented or owned) living as a emancipated person and the number of years elapsed since the individuals started to work. We use retrospective information of the year in which individuals started to work at the current job, the year in which they acquired the owner-occupied house and the year in which they started to live in the rented accommodation. We estimate a discrete choice duration model with two alternative exits to a new house as an emancipated person, we consider a move to an owner-occupied house (D i = 1) or a move to a rented house (D i = 0). The specification of the duration model is similar to those implemented by Bover and Gómez (2004) and Barceló (2006a) . The transition intensity to emancipation with alternative k (home ownership or rental) is defined as the probability of moving to a new house with that alternative at year t after having started to work at current job given that the individual has been working for at least t years. This transition intensity follows a multinomial logit specification:
The hazard rate, θ [t | Z i ] is defined as the probability of leaving home at t years after having started to work at the current job given that the individual i has a job tenure of at least t years, and it is equal to the sum of both transition intensities, as follows:
The individual characteristics (Z i ) considered in the duration model are the following: regional subsidies (Subsidy r,a,t0 ), indicators of region (ξ r ), age at hire (ξ a ), year at hire (ξ t0 ) and other time-invariant characteristics, such as the indicator of the individual's gender and education level. In this model, censored observations correspond with individuals living in the same house as that in which they live when they started to work in the current job. Our parameter of interest in β k from Equation (2) is that associated with the regional subsidies, Subsidy r,a,t0 , which measures the causal impact of an exogenous increase in regional subsidies for job-contract conversions (an exogenous increase in job security) on the probability of moving to a new accommodation through each alternative housing tenure regime k at t years of the job spell given that the individual has a job tenure of at least t years or more.
As Bover and Gómez (2004) emphasize, when the transition intensities follow a multinomial logit specification, we can estimate a competing-risk model for each exit separately, and the conditional exit rates follow a logit binary specification with the same parameters, β k . The conditional exit rate using alternative k gives the probability of moving to a new house with that housing tenure regime k at year t of the job spell given that the individual has been working at least t years and does not move to a new house with the other housing tenure regime. For estimating competing-risk models, exits using the alternative housing tenure regime are also treated as censored observations when we concatenate the survival subsamples on each duration for estimating the parameters of the conditional exit rate of interest using a logit model. All calculations reported in this paper make use of the five data sets imputed multiply by combining estimates using Rubin's rules [see Rubin (1987) ]. broken down by the kind of job contract, the main differences between both subsamples are that the individuals that hold a fixed-term contract are younger, but they were hired at higher ages and their job tenures are shorter. The collective of temporary workers is eligible to benefit from regional subsidies to a higher rate (54% vs. 43%), mainly due to the fact that women (50% vs. 41%
in the subsample of permanent contracts) and very young people are the most prone population groups to hold fixed-term contracts. Moreover, fixed-term workers have achieved lower education levels and their labor income earned in the last year is also much lower than that received by permanent workers (10,481e vs. 17,380e). Finally, the rate of coresidence is 36% among temporary workers, much higher than that of permanent workers (22%), and they are also more likely to live in a rented house (the 22% of individuals) than permantent workers do (only the 13% of permanent workers).
In order to investigate if the pattern of household formation according to the risk of job loss differs highly from the choice of housing demand of the entire population of employees (individuals aged between 25 and 64), we also estimate the same empirical models with this extended sample. The summary statistics of this sample are documented in Table 4 shows reduced-form estimates of linear probability models of the stock of permanent workers and the decision of the housing tenure regime in a sample of employees aged between 25 and 45. We consider three different housing tenure regimes: home ownership, rental and coresidence (living in the parental home).
Causal evidence from a stock sample of individuals
We show reduced-form estimates of the impact of regional subsidies on the decision of housing tenure regime instead of providing Instrumental Variable (IV)
estimates, because the intention-to-treat estimates are much more precise. Panel B of Table 4 shows the reduced-form estimates of the probability of the decision of coresidence (living with parents) and the housing tenure regime in which emancipated individuals are observed to live. First of all, the decision of living with parents seems to be negatively affected by regional subsidies in several years after that the upgrade of job contracts is expected to happen. An increase of 1,000e in regional subsidies decreases significantly the probability of coresidence from 0.6% to 1% several years after the conversion of job contract, when this conversion of contract is highly expected to have already taken place in the previous years (mainly in the first two years). These estimates suggest a decrease from 2.3% to 3.9% in the rate of coresidence due to an exogenous increase of job security given by the rise of 1,000e in the regional subsidies for contract conversion. Meanwhile, individuals with job tenures shorter than seven or nine years (see first three columns in Table 4 We redo the estimates in Table 4 , but using an extended sample of employees aged between 25 and 64, in order to investigate if the pattern of household formation and housing tenure choice differs greatly from the decision of housing demand of the entire population of employees, concerning the risk of job loss. Table 5 shows that first-stage estimates of the stock of individuals holding permanent contracts are much more precise and higher than those in Table 4 . A rise of 1,000e in subsidies increases the stock of permanent workers by 0.7%, what suggests a growth rate of 0.92% in proportion of permantent workers. In the intention-to-treat estimates of Panel B in Table 5 , the only difference we can highlight is that, irrespective of the job tenure, employees are more likely to move to a new accommodation by renting a house rather than by the purchase of the main house in some year of their job tenure after having experienced an increase of 1,000e in the regional subsidies they are eligible for the conversion of job contract. The coefficient estimate of 0.005 implies that the probability of renting a dwelling increases by 3.5% ( 0.005 0.142 ·100 according to summary statistics in Table 2 ).
Causal evidence from a sample of transition data
We further study the exact year of the job spell in which individuals decide to move to a new accommodation as an emancipated person by estimating transition data models by considering two alternative exits, a move to an owneroccupied house or a move to a rented house. Table 6 shows the estimates of how the probability that a young individual moves to a new house, as an emancipated person, varies with the number of years elapsed since the individual started to work. The specification (i) considers a time-invariant effect of regional subsidies on the probabilities of moving and specification (ii) allows for a different effect of subsidies that varies along the time elapsed since the job contract was signed.
Columns (1) and (4) consider a move to a new house (irrespective of the housing tenure regime), and columns (2) and (3) (and columns (5) and (6) in specification (ii)) distinguish the move by the housing tenure regime, whether to an owneroccupied house or to a rented house, respectively. We can see that regional subsidies are significant to explain transitions to a new house at the 1% level of significance, also considering both types of housing tenure, unlike the previous estimates using the stock sample of individuals.
When we allow for time-varying effects of subsidies in columns from (4) to (5) of Table 6 , note that the interaction of the subsidy with the first two years of job tenure is negative in columns (4) and (6) . The interaction of the subsidy with the indicator of job tenure above four years is also negative in column (4) and (6) . That pattern suggests that the demand for new accommodation (possibly household formation) peaks three years after the beginning of the job, about one year later than the period where most conversions are expected to happen. That is, there is a delayed effect of increased job security on household formation. Interestingly, the pattern is most noticeable among renters. Home 21 ownership seems to present a flat pattern according to job tenure. Figure 5 shows the marginal effects of an increase in 1,000e regional subsidies to contract conversion on the probability of each housing tenure regime (rental vs. home ownership) implied by the estimates of specification (ii) in Table   6 , when we allow the subsidy effect to be time-varying across the job spell durations. Marginal effects are expressed in terms of the rate of percentage increase in the probability of moving with each tenure regime, computed using the proportions of each tenure regime in the total sample, shown in Table 3 .
The vertical line indicates the second year of the job spell, when the contract conversion is expected to have occurred.
12 The full black line shows the marginal effects on the probability of renting a new accommodation. We can see that the decision of renting a house seems to be delayed one year after the contract conversion is expected to happen. The pattern of the increase in the likelihood of renting seems to be an inverse U-shaped across job tenure. However, the pattern of the marginal effects on the probability of home ownership (dashed and dotted line) is estimated to be flat across the duration of the job spell, without a clear shape. Strangely, it seems that the rental, the housing tenure regime that entails smaller adjustment costs, is the way of forming a new household more delayed in time after the contract conversion. The following research line to investigate in this paper is try to explain this feature. One possible channel is the presence of borrowing constraints and credit rejections that affects more seriously to those young renters that delayed the decision of forming a new household. Perhaps, these young individuals are "discouraged homeowners", they wished to buy the owner-occupied house, but they could not do it due to the liquidity constraints, and finally, they rented a house.
We have estimated a similar transition data model for the extended sample of employees aged between 25 and 64, in order to find out whether their decision 12 Almost the 75% of the contract conversions from fixed-term contracts into open-ended ones are estimated to happen in the first two years of the workers' job tenure in 2013 in Spain using firms' information from the third wave of the Wage Dynamic Network Survey conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Central Banks of the European Union Member States [see Izquierdo and Jimeno (2015) ].
of housing demand differs or not. Figure 6 shows the marginal effects implied by the estimates of the duration data model. Here we can also appreciate an inverse U-shaped pattern of exits to a rented house, but the differences in the pattern with respect to exits to home ownership are much smaller. After the fifth year of job tenure, moves to a rented house are less likely to be undertaken than those by young individuals aged under 45.
Conclusions
This study exploits two institutional features of the Spanish labor market to address the question: Does the growing incidence of job insecurity among young adults account for their recent patterns of household formation? The advantage of working with Spanish labor market data is the widespread use of low-firing cost contracts, that allows us to identify who young adults are exposed to the risk of job loss. We can also exploit legal changes that influence the labor demand of firms for workers with different contract types to obtain arguably exogenous variation in job insecurity. Thus, we are able to estimate the link between obtaining a more secure job and the decision to establish a new household controlling for other confounding factors.
Our strategy to identify the causal link between job insecurity and household formation uses temporal and regional variation in subsidies that firms were eligible for the conversion of low-firing cost contracts into high firing costs ones between 1997 and 2009.
In the empirical analysis, we use the 2002-2011 waves of the Spanish Survey of Household Finances (in Spanish, Encuesta Financiera de las Familias, EFF).
We encounter that the rate at which employees aged between 25 and 45 live in their parental home decreases by 2.3%-3.9% after an exogenous increase in 1,000e in the regional subsidies for job contract conversions. Moreover, the rate at which the young people form a new household by owning their main residence or by renting their dwelling increases by 0.7% and 4%, respectively. Finally, we provide causal evidence indicating that there is a sluggish response of household formation to job security. We find that demand for new accommodation happens one or two years after the time in which most conversions have occurred, mainly for those individuals who move to a rented new accommodation as an emancipated person. Next, we will try to investigate in the paper whether this feature is associated with the presence of liquidity constraints that affects more seriously to renters. Housing tenure regime and kind of job contract Growth rate (%) of the probability of each housing tenure regime
Job spell duration in years
Rental Home ownership Estimates from a multinomial transition duration model Growth rate (%) of the probability of each housing tenure regime
Rental Home ownership
The graph shows the yearly change in satisfaction with security on the job (measured from 0 to 10) on a window between 5 years before and 6 years after an employee obtains an upgrade from a fixed-term contract (FTC) into a permanent one (PC) Other covariates included in the model not shown here are the following: indicators of age at hire, indicators of year at hire, year dummies, indicators of the household member's gender and education level, a third-order polynomial based on the logarithm of the household member's labor income and region dummies. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity, also take into account arbitrary correlation among regions and combined across 5 implicates. Notes to all Tables: * denotes the estimates are significant at the 10% level, ** at the 5% level and *** at the 1% level.
Young individuals aged between 25 and 45 whose job tenure is: Other covariates included in the model not shown here are the following: indicators of age at hire, indicators of year at hire, year dummies, indicators of the household member's gender and education level, a third-order polynomial based on the logarithm of the household member's labor income and region dummies. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity, also take into account arbitrary correlation among regions and combined across 5 implicates.
Individuals aged between 25 and 64 whose job tenure is: Other covariates included in the model not shown here are the following: indicators of age at hire, indicators of year at hire, year dummies, indicators of the household member's gender and education level, a third-order polynomial based on the logarithm of the household member's labor income and region dummies. Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity, also take into account arbitrary correlation among regions and combined across 5 implicates.
Individuals aged between 25 and 64 whose job tenure is: Table 6 : Estimates of the probability that young individuals move to a new house, as an emancipated person, at each year of their job tenure in a sample of individuals having at least the same length of job tenure or longer ones (also considering movers to a new house before starting to work at the current job) . Source: The sample is formed by all household members aged between 25 and 45 years, who are employees with a job tenure not longer than 10 Standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity, arbitrary correlation among regions and combined across 5 implicates.
Time-invariant effects of subsidies
Time-varying effects of subsidies (i)
(ii) Indicator of whether the individual moves to:
